How is this condition of things to be reconciled with the concrete instances that Dr. Hale has given us of confusion in grammars? The answer is to be sought in an examination of the different types of grammars. The maker of a reference grammar, desiring to be rigidly scientific, and concerned in the part devoted to syntax with arranging constructions by families and species, is tempted to give each specimen a descriptive label. The maker of a beginner's book, interested in practical results, tries to present his material in such form that the student can *recognize and reproduce* the more obvious and important constructions. He does not strive for completeness, and does not ignore the part which repetition and feeling play in the process of recognition and reproduction. The examination of a number of practical grammars shows that rarely do the authors find it desirable to name such a construction as "the subjunctive of wish," for instance, or to refer all subjunctives to a group of metaphysical categories. It is true that those grammars in which this is done disagree as to the categories. It is interesting to note in this connection that the four students mentioned above, who were aware of confusion in their ideas of the subjunctive, traced their confusion to the use of grammars of this type.

THE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENGLISH

F. N. SCOTT
The University of Michigan

Before coming to my proper subject, I shall ask permission to say just a few words upon the general philological question raised by Professor Hale's paper.

The distinction between the indicative forms on the one hand and the conglomerate of linguistic expedients on the other which may be called the imperative-optative-subjunctive-modal-auxiliary form-group does not in my opinion rest, in its origin, upon a categorical distinction between actuality and possibility, or between dependent and independent clauses, or between present attainment and anticipation, but it represents the survival of an earlier stage of language side by side with a later stage.

In its earliest form language, we may be sure, was the expression mainly of emotion. It was indeed nothing more than the vocal concomitant of fear, anger, desire for food, and the like primitive instincts—the result of stresses and strains incident to flight and fight. Its vocabulary was limited to cries of joy or pain, calls for help, imprecations, amatory appeals, and utterances of a similar character. It was, so to speak, a moody language, made up of commands, entreaties, longings, and the expressions of vagrant fancy.

With the development of the intellectual powers—the powers of analysis,

abstraction, and reasoning—language passed into a higher stage. Forms were developed for the expression of percepts, concepts, judgments, and consecutive thought. The subject and the predicate were gradually disentangled. The sentence was organized and sentences linked together. Relations were grasped and got themselves expressed in clausal structure. Thus language as a whole by degrees grew more sophisticated, rational, and regular. Its texture ceased in course of time to be the pattern of the emotions only and became the pattern of the intellect. But the old forms persisted to some extent side by side with the new, being used for the expression of the more emotional and instinctive operations of the mind or the more elemental contacts between man and man. To give but a single instance, in every savage tongue that I know anything about there are many isolated imperatives the origin of which cannot be ascertained. As they are among the most commonly used forms, it is altogether likely that they have come down from an earlier stage of the language. It is common to say of these verbs that the indicative forms have been lost, but the truth appears to be that the indicative never existed. They are the survivors of a period when the savage, since he acted in imperatives, and thought in imperatives, also spoke in imperatives, just as at the present time dogs speak imperatively when they bark at tramps.

My theory of the allied forms of the imperative, subjunctive, and optative, and their equivalents (including, I may add, interjections, which clearly belong in the same group) is that they are old, emotional, instinctive utterances retained after language has passed into an intellectual stage. After the indicative forms had come into use for the expression and communication of more highly intellectualized mental processes, and emotion itself had come to be expressed in the symbols of the intellect, the older forms were still utilized for the conveyance of experiences and attitudes of mind that depart in various ways from the plain assertion or judgment which is the goal of intellectual activity. That the forms and their content would in the lapse of ages undergo frequent and perhaps violent transformations may be taken for granted.

This fragment of a theory, which may have been many times anticipated, for all I know, does not contradict Professor Hale's in any respect. Of the imperative or, as he would say, volitive, I have already spoken. As for the idea of anticipation, that is one of the most characteristic traits of savage thought. The primitive man can think only with difficulty in terms of the fleeting present. His fears, his desires, his commands, his cries for help are all projected into future time, they are all anticipations. The ability to arrest the present thought and hold it steadily before the mind's eye is a mark of comparatively advanced culture. It is, therefore, only natural that the older forms should carry with them the implication of future action.

Turning now to the question of a uniform nomenclature, and consider-

ing it particularly from the standpoint of English, I will say first that English grammar, in my opinion, stands on a quite different footing, for those who speak English, from the grammars of the other languages here represented, whether ancient or modern. I may make this point clear by distinguishing two kinds of grammars—vernacular grammars and foreign grammars. A vernacular grammar is one that is written in the language and deals with the language of the person who uses it. A foreign grammar is one that is written in the language of the person who uses it, but deals with a foreign language. The purposes of the two grammars are measurably different, at least so far as elementary pupils are concerned. The aim of a vernacular grammar is to rationalize for the student something that he already knows, something that is as intimate to him as his own body. It is like a map of the town or township in which he lives. He can test it at any point by his own speech and his reading. His object in studying it is to become better acquainted, one may say, with himself and with his fellow-citizens. Every step in the grammar should reveal to him something that he has already perceived or felt vaguely but has not perhaps seen in its proper connection. The aim of his grammatical study should be to put him in possession intellectually of what he already possesses practically, namely, the genius and structure of the language.

The pupil's relation to a foreign grammar is different from this in many respects. He knows presumably nothing about the subject that he is approaching through the grammar. The purpose of the grammar is to reveal it to him. He is like a person who is finding his way about a strange city by means of a map more or less detailed. Having no knowledge of his own, he must take everything on trust. He is told that the genius of the language appears in such and such particulars, but he has nothing within himself by which to test these assertions, and, if the grammar is of Greek or Latin, probably will never pursue the subject far enough to find out for himself.

Of the nomenclature of the foreign grammar I shall say nothing, but I will give what seem to me to be the guiding principles of the vernacular grammar and leave to others the question whether they apply with equal force to grammars of foreign tongues. There are three of these principles, and I will give them in what I deem to be the order of their importance.

The first principle is that the term chosen to represent a given force or form in grammar should be one that accords, or can readily be made to accord, with the pupil's own feeling for his mother-tongue. The term may possess this quality either through its definiteness or through its indefiniteness. It may suggest at once the right relationship, or it may, like the word *subjunctive,* be a mere counter which means nothing to the pupil until the teacher or the textbook has stamped it with its proper significance and value. A term which powerfully impels the mind in the wrong direction is obviously not fitted for any grammatical nomenclature, uniform or otherwise. An ex-

ample of such a term is the word *govern,* still used in many English gram-
mars. I took occasion some years ago to discover the images aroused in the
minds of children by this word when they encountered it in their grammars.[1]
The results were almost past belief. The most ridiculous ideas were enter-
tained regarding the power of the verb to control the fortunes of the
wretched noun. The same objection may be urged against the use of the
terms *regular* and *irregular* as applied to verbs; and I am not sure that
the terms *strong* and *weak* are in this respect any better, though it is probably
too late to think of displacing them.

That properly descriptive and suggestive terms can by any search or inge-
nuity of invention be discovered for all of the grammatical forces is an
idle dream. All that I should wish to urge is that, of two possible terms,
that one should be chosen which is most likely to arouse and sharpen the
pupil's own native sense for the genius and structure of his mother-tongue.

The second principle is that the term, where possible, should correspond
to a definite and simple category or grammatical function. For my part,
I am not afraid of metaphysical categories, as Professor Hale is. I may
recall the fact, known to all of you, that the ten categories of Aristotle were
drawn directly from the grammatical nomenclature of his day, that these
categories were simply the fundamental ideas or ways of conceiving of things
which in course of time had got themselves represented in the pattern of
the Greek language and so in the terminology of Greek grammar. In seeking
to get rid altogether of metaphysical categories the philologist is thus de-
vouring his own children. The categories of Kant, it is true, were drawn
not from language but from the speculations or spider-webs of the mediae-
val schoolmen, and it may be that Professor Hale is right in putting these
particular categories aside. But categories of some sort, metaphysic of some
sort, we must have in grammar, as in any other science, if we are to make
any progress whatsoever.

Confining myself to elementary grammars, I am tempted to say that a
term which denotes some one definite, clear-cut, unmistakable function or
category, even though it fails to cover all of the historically related forms or
uses, is better than a more accurate and inclusive term that can be defined
only by enumerating all of the uses that fall under it. It is, at any rate, more
helpful to the beginner. To revert to the simile that I used a moment ago,
such a grammar is like the map of the pupil's own town. Since there is
no danger of his getting lost, the map may be drawn in large outlines that show
only the city limits, the wards, and the principal streets. Or we may com-
pare it to the maps in the railroad folders which serve us so well when
we travel, notwithstanding that the states are squeezed or stretched into
strange shapes and the curves of the railroads are mostly ironed out.

[1] *The Figurative Element in Grammatical Terminology.*   Leaflets of the New England Asso-
ciation of Teachers of English, No. 36, December 1, 1905.

The beginner, that is to say, can get on very well with a grammar in which the terms denote simple, fundamental, clearly distinguished concepts, even though they are not strictly in accord with the latest results of philological research.

However, since I do not mean to decry the claims of scholarship even in the most elementary grammar, I would propose as a third requirement that the nomenclature, wherever possible without violating the two previous requirements, should conform to the results of the widest comparative study. If it is possible to frame a simple and clearly defined system of English grammar which, while it traces for the pupil the distinctive pattern of English, is at the same time in harmony with the grammar of Sanskrit, old Persian, Greek, Latin, and the Romance and Germanic languages, by all means let us have it. That is the ideal grammar of the vernacular.

But I do not look for such a grammar to appear very soon. For my part, after such study as I have given to the grammars of a variety of languages, ancient and modern, savage and civilized, I come back in a chastened mood to the sage words of Tylor in his *Primitive Culture:*

It is hard to say which is the more striking, the want of scientific system in the expression of thought by words, or the infinite cleverness of detail by which this imperfection is got over, so that he who has an idea does somehow make shift to get it clearly in words before his own and other minds. The language by which a nation with highly developed art and knowledge and sentiment must express its thoughts is no apt machine devised for such special work, but an old, barbaric engine added to and altered, patched and tinkered into some sort of capability.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGE OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN GERMAN

T. J. C. DIEKHOFF
The University of Michigan

Co-operation between the representatives of the various branches of linguistic study is a most urgent need of our time, and any movement in that direction ought to be heartily welcomed. For this reason, if for no other, I am glad to add a word to the discussion of Professor Hale's paper, of which he very kindly sent me a copy beforehand.

But I can conceive how co-operation, if it be carried too far, if it involve compromises in essentials, might work serious injury to scientific method and do violence to scientific truth. I am very glad to express my sincere admiration for Professor Hale's paper, and I shall show my appreciation for his work, not in the usual manner, by eulogizing and saying "yea and amen" to all he proposes, but rather by pointing out some difficulties which his scheme leaves in the way. As a true